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THE LAW WHOSE LIFE IS NOT LOGIC: EVIDENCE OF
OTHER CRIMES IN CRIMINAL CASES
James W. Payne, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

T is not the intention of the author to concentrate on generalizations in
this article, but an introductory comment of a general character on this
topic seems unavoidable. Assume that D is on trial for the rape of his
fourteen-year-old daughter. He elects not to take the witness stand, claiming
this right under the Fifth Amendment. (a) Could W, an older daughter,
testify that D raped her several times when she was fourteen years old?
(b) Could the prosecutor introduce evidence of a conviction of D for raping
W when she was fourteen years old-i.e., would the foregoing offer of proof
be admissible for any purpose? Obviously, more facts may be needed depending upon the circumstances of a particular case, but these will be
added; meanwhile, the basic problem situation is posed.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

It was not always so, but beginning around 1650 the common law developed the privilege as a reaction against pressure in the form of inquisitorial proceedings conducted by the sovereign to force the suspected religious
heretic to cooperate in furnishing evidence against himself.' The privilege as
embodied in the Fifth Amendment has two basic aspects. First, the defendant in a criminal case cannot be forced to take the witness stand and
testify at all. If he does, he has waived the privilege, at least as far as the
subject matter of this testimony is concerned
Nor may the prosecution
comment on the failure of the accused to testify without committing reversible
error.' Second, a witness in any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding may
not refuse to give testimony under oath, but he may refuse to answer
*Professor of Law, University of Richmond. LL.B., University of Richmond, 1948,
B.A., 1952; LL.M., Harvard, 1954. Member, Virginia Bar.
1 See MAoUmE, EVMENCE oF GUILT § 1.02 (1959).
2
See Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1925), and cases cited therein.
Cf. Smith v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 585, 30 S.E.2d 26 (1944). See also People v.
Barthel, 231 Cal. App. 2d 827, 833-34, 42 Cal. Rptr. 290, 294-95 (1965).
3
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Cf. De Luna v. United States, 308
F.2d 140, 1 A.L.R.3d 969 (5th Cir. 1962); Blair v. Commonwealth, 166 Va. 715, 185
S.E. 900 (1936).
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specific questions if, under the circumstances of that case, there is a possibility that any reasonably conceivable answer might tend to incriminate
the witness-i.e., reveal that the witness has committed a criminal act4 or an
5
act carrying with it the possibility of a penalty or forfeiture.
If this article were a treatise on the privilege, the author would be forced
to explore the vast and subtle array of rules that have developed in addition
to, supplementary to, and by way of expansion of these "core" rules of the
Fifth Amendment. That is not the province of this article, but the reasons
for retention of the privilege, outlined in such meager fashion, are relevant
to the problems discussed herein.
The first argument in favor of retention of the privilege is that it prevents
police brutality. Indeed the Escobedo-Miranda complex of cases 6 seems
primarily concerned with this aspect of the privilege, applying the Sixth
Amendments guarantee of counsel to the states to afford complete protection to the rights of the suspect under the Fifth Amendment. 7 One answer
to this argument is that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can be and has been applied to safeguard the accused against unduly
coercive police tactics ranging from physical brutality to prolonged questioning which might break the will of the accused and result in a truthful or
false confession. 8 This application of the Fifth Amendment tolls the bell
4

See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S.
479, 486-87 (1951): "The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would
in themselves support a conviction . . . but likewise embraces those which would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute . . . if the witness, upon
interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard . . . he would be compelled
to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain
the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation
of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could
result." The Court, quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881), added
that it must be "'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances
in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have
such tendency' to incriminate." 341 U.S. at 488.
5
See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 2.03 (1959).
6
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
See also MAGUIRE, WEINSTEIN, CIEIADBOURN & MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON

EVIDENCE 41-50 (Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CASES ON EVIDENCE] (extensive
discussion of these decisions, the problems raised thereby, and satellite cases); Davis v.
North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965);
Angelet v. Fay, 381 U.S. 654 (1965); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). See generally Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (retroactivity).
7
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
8
See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT §§ 2.01, 2.02 (1959); MCCORMICK, IIANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 136 (1954)
DENCE].

[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK, EVI-
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for Wigmore's originally untenable suggestion that the privilege was confined to judicial proceedings. 9 It is perhaps true, as a matter of proof, that
the accused is better protected from false testimony regarding the fact of a
confession or admission and the manner in which it was obtained if he
can be assured of prompt access to Miranda'sguarantees, despite the fact that
the state has the burden of proving the fact of a confession and its voluntary character. 10 There can be, of course, a factual issue as to police procedures by way of compliance with these rules. Nor have all of the extensions
or limitations on the rules been explored." If, as would seem usual, the
accused knows more about his connection with the crime than anyone
else in the courtroom; and if, as is usually assumed, the jury might view
his silence with a jaundiced eye which could fairly balance the dangers
of impeachment of his testimony, some argument can be made thus far
in favor of removing this rather massive grant of immunity via silence to
the accused. If some undefined but general public sense of fairness or
tradition dictates otherwise, the matter could be handled by local legisla12
tion.
A second argument in favor of retention of the Constitutional privilege
is that it encourages the police to exercise diligence in digging out evidence
of the guilt of the accused.13 This is allied with the rule that the corpus
delecti cannot be established solely on the basis of an uncorroborated confession 4 and the current rules excluding involuntary and exculpatory
admissions; 15 and, indeed, the force of the argument is somewhat diminished
9

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);

MAGUIRE,

EVIDENCE OF GUILT

§ 2.03 n.2 (1959).

10 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470, 473, 475 (1966).
11 See CASES ON EVIDENCE 43 n.3 et seq.
12See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 2.02 at 13:

"Many advocates of privilege

against self-incrimination strongly emphasize desire to obviate risk of brutality by
police and others connected with prosecution. This invites from opponents the proposal
of withdrawing privilege for any orderly public inquiry supervised by a judge or corresponding disinterested official. That proposal in turn rouses the response that police
or jailers might use or threaten force as a preparation for, or a vengeful possibility
after, the supervised open inquiry. Such response of course poses the unsolved problem
of assuring proper conditions of detention, with a consequent further unpleasant risk,
all too often realized. Deprived of assurance that the prosecutor can probe for a suspect's
information by decent, orderly questioning, police are tempted to bully their prisoner
into admissions suggesting lines of investigation usable to turn up other evidence of
guilt. The privilege may encourage torture rather than the reverse."
13
See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 2.02 (1959).

14

See Pepoon v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 804, 811-12, 66 S.E.2d 854, 858-59 (1951);

MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 110 (1954).
15

See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S.
85 (1963); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
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by these latter doctrines. 16 This reasoning is reminiscent of Kipling's suggestion that it is easier to sit in the sun rubbing red pepper in some poor devil's
eyes than to run about in the sun searching for evidence. Jeremy Bentham
damned the argument as "the fox hunter's reason." 17 Professor Maguire
makes a comment that could be applicable despite Miranda, particularly
in the case of the suspect who does not avail himself of Miranda'sextension
of privilege:
Begin, then, with the proposition that privilege against self-incrimination
is supportable only because it brings substantial benefit to the community
by aiding the innocent, by tending to convict the guilty or at least on the
whole not unduly impeding conviction, and by advancing good public
policy in other ways. On the first two scores, we have a carefully framed
argument that if a prosecutor (1) were lazy, unconscientious, or proud
of his ability to turn a witness inside out, and (2) were guaranteed opportunity to interrogate a defendant exhaustively, with full official sanction to compel answers, he would tend to rely solely upon this opportunity,
neglecting more laborious and showy forms of investigation and compilation of evidence. He might then trick an innocent person into conviction,
or let a man guilty but nimble-witted steer his way to acquittal. This
explanation should have its grain of salt. Suppose privilege against selfincrimination were abolished, but a requirement retained that the
prosecutor must make his prima facie case without relying upon testimony
from the defendant-this requirement being surely a minimum indispensable safeguard under good common law tradition. Bearing in mind the
supplementary rule against admission of evidence of involuntary confessions, would there not remain very substantial incentive to proper industry
by police and prosecuting officers? 18
One argument does seem invulnerable except for the fact that it applies
to relatively few people: 19 a witness might be less apt to dodge a subpoena
when aware of or assured of the privilege. This, of course, does not affect
the defendant in a criminal case whose presence is generally assured by quite
different methods.
Despite all of the foregoing arguments, mostly calculated to punch logical
holes in the current retention of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination, the most important argument in favor of the privilege
is not lacking in sentiment or notable for logical analysis. The privilege,
16 Cf.
17

MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§
MAGUME, EVDENCE OF GUiLT

18Id. at 12-13.
19 See id. at 13.

110, 111, at 233 (1954).
§ 2.02 n.3 (1959).
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historically, has created respect for the procedures whereby law is administered and justice sought. 20 There has been a felt need for the privilege, and
it has been with us for a long time. It is not at all certain that abandoning
it would do more than create public uneasiness as to some segments of
our legal system. Again Professor Maguire notes in his pithy style: "But
one point should certainly be made in favor of retaining the privilege. Accustomed personal safeguards, fixed in men's minds by usage of decades
and centuries, are not lightly to be destroyed." 21
Dean Erwin Griswold has referred to the privilege against self-incrimination as "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized" 2-as a step beyond the sovereign use of torture as a means of
obtaining evidence. He also states:
We have through the course of history developed a considerable feeling
of the dignity and intrinsic importance of the individual man. Even the
evil man is a human being.
If a man has done wrong, he should be punished. But the evidence
against him should be produced, and evaluated by a proper court in a
fair trial. Neither torture nor an oath nor the threat of punishment such
as imprisonment for contempt should be used to compel him to provide
the evidence to accuse or to convict himself. If his crime is a serious
one, careful and often laborious police work may be required to prove
it by other evidence. Sometimes no other evidence can be found. But
for about three centuries in the Anglo-American legal system we have
accepted the standard that even then we do not compel the accused to
provide that evidence. I believe that it is a good standard, and that it is an
expression of one of the fundamental decencies in the relation we have
23
developed between government and man.
Dean Griswold also links the privilege with the familiar rule that a man
24
is innocent until proved guilty.
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES IN CRIMINAL CASES

It is axiomatic that the prosecution cannot introduce evidence tending
to show that the defendant in a criminal case is a bad man or that he has
20

See GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 73 (1955): "I believe the Fifth
Amendment is, and has been through this period of crisis, an expression of the moral
striving of the community. It has been a reflection of our common conscience, a symbol
of the America which stirs our hearts."
21 MAOUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 2.02, at 14 (1959).
22
GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
23 Id. at 7-8.
24 See id. at 9.
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criminal propensities generally for the purpose of proving that the defendant
committed the crime with which he is charged. 25 Equally familiar are rules
permitting impeachment of the accused if he elects to testify.2 6 These rules
vary in scope, with some jurisdictions confining the prosecution's impeaching
27
testimony in the nature of criminal behavior to proof of criminal convictions.
Generally, these must be convictions involving the commission of a felony or
a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.2 8 In some jurisdictions proof of
prior criminal activity not resulting in conviction is allowed.2 All courts
agree that such evidence, when offered to impeach, operates only to reflect
on the credibility of the accused and that the evidence cannot be received
as substantive proof, the defendant being entitled to a limiting instruction
to this extent. 3° Trial lawyers generally are not so naive as to believe that
1
these limitations as spelled out by the judge are adhered to by the jury
Eminent scholars have also experienced difficulty with the distinction; but
32
the case is one of half a loaf being better than none.
Our specific problem is both related to and apart from the rules noted
above. We are concerned with the admissibility of evidence of the defendants criminal conduct when such evidence is offered to establish guilt. This
kind of proof is necessarily an exception to Cardozo's fluent pronouncement:
If a murderous propensity may be proved against a defendant as one
of the tokens of his guilt, a -rule of criminal evidence . . . must first be
declared away. Fundamental hitherto has been the rule that character
is never an issue in a criminal prosecution unless the defendant chooses
to make it one. . . . In a very real sense a defendant starts his life
afresh when he stands before a jury, a prisoner at the bar.... Inflexibly
the law has set its face against the endeavor to fasten guilt upon him by
proof of character or experience predisposing to an act of crime ....
The principle back of the exclusion is one, not of logic, but of policy ....
25 See Jones v. La Crosse, 180 Va. 406, 23 S.E.2d 142 (1942); MCCORMICK, EvrDENCE § 157 (1954); 1 WIGMBORE, EVIDENCE §§ 55, 57 (3d ed. 1940); MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE rule 311 (1942); UNIFORzt RULE OF EVIDENCE 55.
26
27

See generally McCoRMCK, EVIDENCE §§ 33, 50 (1954).

See id. § 42.
See Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 20 S.E.2d 509 (1942); MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 43 (1954).
29
E.g., Shailor v. Bullock, 78 Conn. 65, 61 A. 65 (1905). See UNIFORM RULE OF
28

EVIDENCE 22 (d) : "[E]vidence of specific instances of his conduct relevant only as tending
to prove a trait of his character, shall be inadmissible."

30 See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 39 (1954).
31

ee Medlin v. County Board of Education, 167 N.C. 239, 241, 83 S.E. 483, 484
(1914); Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1454, 1464 (1941).
32 See McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE § 39 & n.14 (1954).
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There may be cogency in the argument that a quarrelsome defendant
is more likely to start a quarrel than one of a milder type, a man of
dangerous mode of life more likely than a shy recluse. The law is not
blind to this but equally it is not blind to the peril to the innocent if
character is accepted as probative of crime. "The natural and inevitable
tendency of the tribunal-whether judge or jury-is to give excessive
weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to
allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof
of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present
charge." 33
But even Cardozo recognized the existence of many exceptions to his
rule predicated upon relevancy for a different purpose, 34 and Professor
Morgan expressly states in the Foreword to the Model Code of Evidence:
"Such evidence [of other crimes or wrongs offered to prove the commission
of a specified crime or wrong] is made inadmissible only where it is relevant
solely as tending to prove a disposition to commit such a crime or wrong
or to commit crimes or wrongs generally. If it is relevant for any other
purpose, it is admissible." 35
It is our concern to list and analyze the major exceptions to the rule of
People v. Zackowitz3 6 and to attempt partial refutation of Professor
Morgan's rigid position by suggesting limiting factors, including an application of the policy underlying the privilege against self-incrimination,
which should and do operate to exclude such evidence. Analytically, the
privilege, conceived of as invalidating sovereign pressure to force an accused
37
to give evidence against himself, is not applicable to such offers of proof.
Professor McCormick offers a list of the major exceptions to the Zackowitz
rule which does not purport to be complete. 38 Nor does the following material purport to exhaust the available case material, which has been
described as akin to the sands in the sea. 39 It will be noted in this partial
review of the legions of decisions, that the cases are often lacking in
consistency; that they are not notable for precise definition; that they can
be confusing in terminology; that distinctions are sometimes drawn without
33 People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930) (emphasis added).
See I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1940); CASES ON EVIDENCE 566-67 (5th ed.
1965).
34
People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. at 468.
35 Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 31 (1942).
36254N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930).
37
See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 2.082, at 94-95 (1959).
38

39

MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §

See id. n. 2.

157 (1954).
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any apparent logical basis; that the application of the rules will vary in statement and application according to jurisdiction; that there is some tendency
to resort to solving phrases; and that often the exceptions, applied in slot
machine fashion, unduly evade the rule and caveat so forcefully stated
by Cardozo.
According to Professor McCormick's list, evidence of a prior crime is
admissible when offered: "To complete the story of the crime on trial by
proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place. This
is often characterized as proving a part of the "same transaction' or the
'res gestae.' " 40
41
This thought was present in Pound's dissent in People v. Zackowitz:
The possession of these dangerous weapons was a separate crime ...
The broad question is whether it had any connection with the crime
charged....
The people may not prove against a defendant crimes not alleged in
the indictment . . . unless such proof tends to establish (1) motive;
(2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or
plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to
each other that proof of the one tends to establish the other; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.
These exceptions are stated generally and not with categorical precision
and may not be all-inclusive. People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E.
286.... None of them apply here, nor were the weapons offered under
an exception to the general rule. They were offered as part of the transaction itself.... The rule laid down in the Molineux case has never been
applied to prevent the people from proving all the elements of the offense
charged, although separate crimes are included in such proof. Thus in this
case no question is made as to the separate crime of illegal possession
of the weapon with which the killing was done. It was "a part of the
history of the case" having a distinct relation to and bearing upon the
facts connected with the killing.42
In Timmons v. Commonwealth 3 the same ambiguous thought is mingled
with admissibility of other crime evidence to show malice, motive, intent,
and "the degree of atrociousness of the crime." Here the defendant was
found guilty of murder in the first degree for the killing of one Ann Bannon
and sentenced to death for that offense. There was uncontradicted evidence
40 Id. at 328 (emphasis added).

41 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930).
42 172 N.E. at 470-71 (emphasis added).
43
204 Va. 205, 129 S.E.2d 697 (1963).
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that the defendant shot and killed Mrs. Bannon and also shot her friend,
one Mrs. Lewis, and finally that he raped both women. For our purposes
we are interested in the following assignments of error on appeal. First,
the contention that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting
in evidence photographs of the dead woman and accompanying slides. With
reference to this assignment, the court stated:
The photographs of the victim were relevant to show the degree of
atrociousness of the crime, or the malice with which it was committed.
The state of disarray of the deceased's clothes shed light on the motive
and intent of the defendant, as revealed in his contemporaneous acts.
The photographs clearly and simply show more than any witness, save
defendant, actually saw at the time of the killing. The question of their
admissibility was one resting in the sound discretion of the trial court.44
The court, in discussing the cross-examination of another witness, made
reference to the fact that "the defendant sought to magnify the depravity
and brutality of his acts to give substance to the argument that he was
insane." 45 But the court found that the defendant was sane, and there being
no dispute as to what he did, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
photographs had an overwhelming tendency to influence the jury's mind
and very little cogency for any other purpose. This seems a doubtful case
46
of proper exercise of strict judicial discretion.
44

Id. at 214, 129 S.E.2d at 703 (emphasis added).
Id. at 215, 129 S.E.2d at 703.
46
See also Westry v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 508, 144 S.E.2d 427 (1965) where
the defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree over a plea of not
guilty. Defendant had argued that the homicide was committed by one Capps. The
trial court admitted photographs of the body of the deceased taken after its discovery.
On appeal the court commented:
Defendant's contention is that these photographs were not relevant or material
and tended only to inflame the jury. There is nothing to indicate that they had
that effect. "The picture of the wounded body of a man in the repose of death
should excite no more sympathy or prejudice than the exhibition of a living
person with a bruised, broken, and torn body." Id. at 513, 144 S.E.2d at 431.
By way of comment it is difficult to see what the court would expect to find to indicate
jury prejudice. The verdict was one of second degree murder and this kind of evidence
is generally conceded to be prejudicial. The court refers to the "repose of death" as
though this victim's appearance was relatively peaceful. The victim here had been
shot and beaten about the head with sufficient force to break a gun barrel. The court
adds:
The photographs here afforded some corroboration of the medical testimony and
of the testimony of Capps, and as was said . . . in Timmons v. Commonwealth,
supra, they were admissible "to show the degree of atrociousness of the crime,
or the malice with which it was committed." Ibid.
The court's willingness to admit evidence tending to show the "degree of atrociousness
45
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Regarding the second assignment of error, which dealt with the testimony
of Mrs. Lewis, the court stated: "There is no merit in the contention that
it was error to permit Mrs. Lewis to testify as to the rapes upon her." 47
The court noted that counsel waived his right to except here by failure to
object,8 but indicated that this evidence of a separate crime would have
been admissible anyway, using language that is consistent with Professor
McCormick's rule:
The killing and rapes all occurred within a few minutes. The offenses
were so closely connected and interwoven as to be a continuous series
of acts tending to show the intention and motive of the defendant. It is
impossible to separate them and get a complete view of the whole case
and the reasons therefor....
Generally speaking, it is not proper on the trial of a criminal case to
admit testimony of a prior independent crime; but there is an exception
to the rule as well established as the rule itself that such testimony is
admissible where it shows motive, intent, or is related to or connected
with or leads up to the offense for which the accused is on trial.49
Note the alternative statement of the admissible purpose and, finally, the
decision in Compton v. Commonwealth50 where the defendant was prosecuted for breaking into a chicken house. He objected to evidence, offered
and received in the trial court, that he had shot the owner of the chicken
coop, for which offense he had been tried and convicted. The court stated,
"This shooting occurred while-the act of housebreaking was yet in progress
and was so inseparably connected with it as to make the avoidance of all
reference to it practically impossible. . . .The shooting was part of the
res gestae and limited reference to'it was admissible." 51
Where Timmons tossed in motive and intent along with the history of
of a crime" or the "malice with which it was committed" appears to be another way
of stating that the evidence shows what the defendant is capable of doing, and it is
difficult for this writer to reconcile either the princple underlying the general rule of
Zackowitz (admittedly the general rule in Virginia; see Timmons v. Commonwealth,
204 Va. at 215, 129 S.E.2d at 704) or the principle 'underlying the prohibition against
making inquiry into the details of a crime or criminal convictions offered for impeachment purposes.

47 204 Va. at 215, 129 S.E.2d at 703.
48 Ibid.
49 Id. at 215, 129 S.E.2d at 703-04 (emphasis added).
50 190 Va. 48, 55 S.E.2d 446 (1949).
51 Id. at 55, 55 S.E.2d at 449; see Huffman v. Commonwealth; 168 Va. 668, 190
S.E. 265 (1937); Calvin v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 663, 137 S.E. 476 (1927).
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the case as facts to be established by prior crime evidence, the Compton
case relied on a statement of the fact of close connection in time and the invocation of the Latin phrase res gestae, which means literally, "things done."
If the rule admitting proof of prior crimes is handled in language laden
with this degree of ambiguity, it amounts to little more than a poorly camouflaged statement of fiat which defies understanding and predictability, but
does enable the prosecution to show the predisposition of the accused to
commit a crime in order to secure a conviction. The same is generally true
of the rule noted by Professor McCormick, and the cases cited by him as
illustrative, insofar as the evidence of prior crimes can be imbedded in a
rule allowing such evidence as part of the "history of the case" or as the
"things done." The same "argument" would have dictated a different result
in Zackowitz. The factor of substantial prejudice is obvious. The justification, insofar as practical convenience or necessity is part and parcel of the
language in the cases noted thus far, seems as dubious as the cogency of the
evidence to prove the crime with which the defendant is charged.
At least three limiting factors should be noted with reference to evidence
of the kind under consideration. It has been asserted that
originally this [exclusionary] rule [that we have labelled the Zackowitz
rule] was a narrow one,--that if the offered evidence is relevant solely
by a series of inferences which proceed from the other crimes to the
disposition of the accused to commit such crimes, and thence to the
probability of his having committed the crime charged, it is not admissible. Under this narrow rule evidence of other crimes (which does not
depend upon evil dispositions as a basis of logical inference) may be
freely admitted in the discretion of the trial judge whenever it is logically
relevant to either an ultimate or intermediate probandum before the
court; not just in case it can be fitted into the pigeonhole of an exception
to the broad rule of exclusion, but rather because it is completely outside
52
the scope of the rule of absolute exclusion.
The author approves of a narrow application of the rule of exclusion,
stated affirmatively, with the suggestion that "[i]t makes clear the basis
of exclusion and directs the attention of the trial courts to the question of
logical relevancy." 13 (1) But the author unequivocally concedes the first
major limiting factor on the admission of an exception: the trial judge
may exclude evidence of other crimes because of undue prejudice 54 -i.e.,
52 Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5
385, 404-05 (1952).
53 Id. at 405.

54 Id. at 409 and cases cited therein.

VAND.

L. Rtv.
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prejudice that is disproportionate to the cogency of the evidence. (2) At the
risk of some redundancy and by way of emphasis there should be some showing of substantial necessity in the reception of the evidence. The authors
of Cases on Evidence suggest that the fact to be shown should be in dispute
or that the issue must be a relatively serious one.55 Thus they state:
But see State v. Winget, 6 Utah 2d 243, 310 P.2d 738 (1957), a prosecution for rape of defendant's eight-year-old daughter, in which the state
was allowed to put in the testimony of defendant's seventeen-year-old
stepdaughter that defendant had raped her four times when she was
eight or nine years old and when she was twelve years old. The court
reversed the conviction, adhering to a position taken in an earlier case,
that evidence of similar sex acts with persons other than the complaining
witness is inadmissible. A well-reasoned concurring opinion points out
that, "[The evidence of the earlier offenses] might tend to establish the
identity of the person who perpetrated the crime charged if there were
any serious issue or doubt on the question of whether the daughter
knew her own father, but here no such doubt is claimed. The same
is true of the proof of criminal intent. The commission of the offense
charged as testified by the complaining witness obviously shows the
criminal intent of the person who perpetrated such offense." 56

The authors add:
In deciding the admissibility of other crime evidence, there surely
ought to be the consideration of the necessity for such evidence in
another sense. Peery v. State, 165 Neb. 752, 87 N.W.2d 378 (1958),
was a prosecution for breaking and entering with intent to steal. A
revolver was taken away from the house that had been burglarized.
Although the police testified that they later found this revolver in defendant's possession, the trial court also admitted evidence of two crimes
committed by defendant, subsequent to the burglary, in which, it was
testified, he had used a revolver similar in appearance to the one taken
in the burglary. The appellate court found no error in admitting the
evidence. See State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 430, 118 S.E. 803, 812 (1923)
(forgery case in which authorship of allegedly forged writing was in
issue; despite availability of neutral standards of defendant's handwriting,
prosecution chose to rely on standards indicating his guilt of other
forgeries)....57
55 See CASES ON EVIDE c 581 (5th ed. 1965).
56Ibid. Is this something more than a sufficiency of evidence problem?
57 Ibid.
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The problem posed by these cases would seem to differ from that raised
in the preceding paragraph in the sense that in the latter instances there
was simply no necessity for evidence of other crimes to establish relevant
facts. This difference may embody considerations of degree, but the gap
and the absence of necessity are more blatantly apparent in the latter cases.
This is also law by shibboleth and an abandonment of judicial responsibility.
(3) Third, and admittedly related to our prior considerations, is the
concept of "remoteness." It is axiomatic that the trial judge has discretion
to exclude evidence where the cogency is slight and the prejudicial impact
is excessive. This is true even under Professor Morgan's sweeping pronouncement. Note Burnette v. Commonwealth, 8 which combines this
thought with the more absolute concept of relevancy. Here the defendant was
prosecuted under a warrant charging that he did "store and offer for sale
illegal type fireworks ... . ,59 His punishment was fixed at six months in
jail and a one hundred dollar fine. The defendant's store had been searched
pursuant to a warrant, and the search had revealed legal fireworks on
display and a quantity of illegal fireworks stored in boxes but not on display. During the trial, the sheriff testified that he saw some sailors go
into the defendant's store, come out, and then proceed to use firecrackers
(an illegal type of fireworks). The trial court charged the jury that this
evidence was admissible for the limited purpose of showing why a search
warrant was obtained but not to show a sale of illegal fireworks. On
appeal, the court held as a matter of law that the evidence as to the fireworks in boxes was not sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt a display of illegal fireworks from which an offer to sell might be inferred. The
court further pointed out that, in view of the trial court's instruction, the
evidence as to the sailors' conduct could not be used by the jury to infer
an illegal sale by the defendant. Therefore, there was no evidence of such a

sale. The court assumed that a finding of either storing or selling illegal
fireworks might establish a criminal offense. However, since the jury's verdict was based, in part, upon a finding of an illegal sale, the court suggested
that this might have influenced the jury as to the punishment imposed and
remanded the case for a new trial.'
Uniform Rule of Evidence 45 provides:

Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the judge may in his
58 203 Va. 455, 125 S.E.2d 171 (1962).
59 Id. at 456, 125 S.E.2d at 172.
0Id. at 457, 458, 460, 125 S.E.2d at 172, 174, 175.
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discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will (a) necessitate
undue consumption of time, or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable
opportunity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered.
The comment on the rule states as follows:
This applies to frequently arising situations where the trial may get
out of hand by the injection of collateral issues having only slight probative value and which would tend to confuse the jury or have illegitimate
emotional appeal. [E.g., evidence of insurance coverage in personal
injury actions, evidence of the existence of prior accidents to show
negligence, or lack of prior accidents to show care in the maintenance
of premises, etc.] Obviously the judge should have some discretion to
prevent the trial from going off on tangents of relative unimportance.
Likewise some protection is needed from unfair surprise with respect to
such matters. This represents the sort of thing which the trial judge does
every day in actual practice and which is sanctioned here, in the assurance that the results of rare and harmful abuse of discretion will be
readily corrected on appeal. It is a rule of necessity. Its sanction cannot
61
be escaped if we are to have orderly and efficient trial procedure.
Finally, in State v. Goebe162 D was convicted of committing rape and
sodomy on a young woman referred to as A. On appeal, the prosecution
argued that evidence of an attempted rape on the person of C shortly before
the assault on A should be admitted to show the plan, scheme, or bent of
mind of the defendant.6 The court replied:
[We are of the opinion that this class of evidence, where not essential to
the establishment of the state's case, should not be admitted, even though
falling within the generally recognized exceptions to the rule of exclusion,
when the trial court is convinced that its effect would be to generate heat
instead of diffusing light, or, . . . where the minute peg of relevancy

will be entirely obscured by the dirty linen hung upon it. This is a
situation where the policy of protecting a defendant from undue prejudice conflicts with the rule of logical relevance, and a proper deteriiination as to which should prevail rests in the sound discretion of the trial
61

UNIFOiJ% RULE OF EVIDENCE 45.

62 36 Wash.2d 367, 218 P.2d 300 (1950).
63 218 P.2d at 303.
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court, and not merely on whether the evidence comes within certain
categories which constitute exceptions to the rule of exclusion. . ..
Professor McCormick states the second exception as follows: "To prove
the existence of a larger continuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which
the present crime on trial is a part. This will be relevant as showing motive,
and hence the doing of the criminal act, the5 identity of the actor, and his
6
intention, where any of these are in dispute."
Presumably Professor McCormick is referring here to those decisions
which allow such evidence to show a "common scheme or plan." If so, two
comments are called for. First, the rule, as McCormick states it, joins in
with the preceding material to illustrate how such exceptions are usually
lumped together, intermingled, and offered in a multi-faceted manner and
for multi-faceted purposes which makes it virtually impossible to discuss
a single exception in isolation. Second, if McCormick is referring to the
"common scheme" exception, his formulation of the rule is marked by a
kind of lucidity that is not apparent in the cases. The courts accept, with
regularity, evidence of prior wrongs or crimes to show a "common scheme
or plan." 66 What is meant by this phrase in actual usage? Some of the
cases support Professor McCormick's careful statement and may be found
for illustrative purposes in his treatise.6 7 From that point, meanings vary
and there is an occasional effort, that seems almost studied, to admit evidence
for this purpose when both cogency and definition appear as shadows in a
darkened place. Some decisions, not supportable under the habit pattern
rule, seemingly demand "conformity in pattern" between offenses charged.'
For example, if the evidence is tendered to show the division of a "common
batch" of contraband (e.g., narcotics), it has been admitted. In this connection reference can be made to United States v. Montalvo6O which apparently links the "common scheme" notion with evidence tending to show
participation therein, i.e., that the scheme was consummated, although the
reasoning is devoid of the "common scheme" phrase, and ends, not with
a bang, but a whimper. Here, one Rovira had been with the defendants
while they were under surveillance which ended in a search disclosing the
64Id. at 306 (emphasis added).

See Day v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907, 86 S.E.2d

23 (1955).

65 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 157, at 328 (1954).
66

See id. § 157.
67 Id. § 157 at 328 n.5.
68
Lyles v. State, 215 Ga. 229, 109 S.E.2d 785 (1959); People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d
306, 169 P.2d 924 (1946). But see State v. Marchand, 31 N.J. 223, 156 A.2d 245
(1959) ; People v. Peete, supra (dissent).
69 271 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1959).
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defendants' possession of heroin. Rovira was observed twice driving at slow
speed past defendant Montalvo's apartment building. He was then arrested
in a nearby drugstore in possession of a penknife, the blade of which was
caked with a small quantity of heroin. This latter fact, of course, tended to
show an earlier commission of a crime. The court admitted the evidence
of Rovira's conduct and possession of the incriminating knife stating:
The evidence was not admitted to show that since William Rovira had
committed another narcotics offense at some unspecified date, [not
in issue here] he might be supposed capable of committing another one
now. The government was seeking to show that Rovira, who had been
with Montalvo earlier, was about to rejoin him to carry out the illegal
enterprise. Rovira's possession of a tool whose suitability to that end
was made plain by its previous use in a similar one, twas this evidence
necessary to establish suitability or even the basis for arrest?] was relevant
to that issue.70
The court pays deference to the discretion of the trial judge and concludes
in limp fashion: "For if the evidence did not have a great tendency to lead,
it had equally little to mislead." 7' The writer lacks the confidence of the
court that such evidence had little tendency to mislead, but shares the
court's apparent feeling that the evidence possessed slight cogency. It
is diffifult to accept substantial belief that this evidence, dealing with a
heroin-caked knife, would not prejudice a jury. The general rule, which
sounds a bit like an evasion of the habit rule, has been stated in State v.
72
Bock:
Proof of similar acts constituting separate and distinct crimes is admissible under an exception to the general rule, not for the purpose of
showing specifically that defendant committed the crime with which he
has been charged, but for the purpose of permitting the trier of facts
to draw an inference from the evidence showing a general plan or scheme,
consisting of a series of acts similar to that with which defendant is
charged, that he did commit the crime with which he is charged. 73
This language is, in the writer's opinion, both confusing and contradictory.
It sounds like the judge is handing the jury its fish and chips with one
hand and taking them away with another, since the jury obviously is sup70 Id. at 927.
71 Ibid.

72 229 Minn. 449, 39 N.W.2d 887 (1949).
73 39 N.W.2d at 891.
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posed to consider this evidence on the issue of guilt. Perhaps the judge is
stating that such evidence (of prior crimes) is not to be treated as conclusive, but surely there must be a more intelligible way of stating this to
the jury. 74 The authors of Cases on Evidence furnish additional cases in
their notes. 75
A tangential problem in this area deals with the quantum of proof needed
to establish the existence of other crimes. The general rule has been stated
to the effect that such evidence must be substantial, but this is no require76
ment that the other crime be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Also, it has been noted with some caution that a history of sex offenses
might be provable to show a propensity for committing a particular type
of crime:
If by disposition to commit crimes of widely different types under
different factual situations independent of any particular objective or
motive-a general criminal proneness, so to speak-the enormity of the
proposition is such that evidence of one or two or three different types
of crimes would seem at best very weak in probative value. So a rule
of absolute exclusion based upon the policies of undue prejudice, surprise and collateral issues may be reasonable enough when the best that
can be said for the evidence offered is a tendency to prove a proposition
of such broad scope. But when the evidence offered shows clearly a disposition to commit the particular type of crime now charged, a much
more narrow proposition is asserted, which in turn under the peculiar
circumstances of some cases may have such a high probative value as
to be near certainty. The sex cases, particularly those involving homosexuals, are an example. Because of the increasing belief that sexual
psychopaths have a disposition to repeat their acts of aggression, the
probative value of evidence of other such offenses is considered to be
so high that some courts are beginning to question even the narrow rule
of absolute exclusion. Is there a variable here that can be handled
better under a rule of discretionary exclusion? It is not the purpose of
this paper to attempt an answer to the question; but rather it is to
emphasize that only by so identifying and defining the existing policies of
exclusion can there be an evaluation and improvement for the future
77
of this part of the law of evidence.
74 Cf. State v. Harris, 153 Iowa 592, 133 N.W. 1078 (1912); State v. Bock, 229
Minn. 449, 39 N.W. 2d 887 (1949) ; State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200, 136 S.W. 316 (1911);
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 688 (1961).
75 CASES ON EVIDENCE 587-91 (1965). See also McCORMicKC, EVIDENCE § 157 (1954).
76 Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REv.

385, 409-10 (1952).
77
Id. at 406.
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In addition to the arguments noted in the footnote reference to Cases on
Evidence,78 and conceding a high rate of recidivism in such cases, the high
probative value noted by Professor Trautman which seems pointed primarily
toward the issue of identity or proof of the corpus delecti and the defendant
as its perpetrator in its narrowest sense, i.e., the use of the question for
illustrative purposes, resembles the now rejected argument that evidence
of financial need on D's part tends to prove not only that he borrowed
money, but that he borrowed from a particular person and signed a particular note.79 The evidence is relevant from the viewpoint of strict logic but
generally not admitted, Holmes observed, as a concession to the shortness
of life. 80 This comment, of course, is by way of disagreement with Professor
Trautman's suggestion, implied in part, but explicit on the problem of
relevancy, that the evidence should be admitted.
Returning to the mainstream, we ask again what is meant by the phrase
"common scheme or plan"? As Professor-McCormick states the rule, motive
or intent or some other specific factor is involved in the sense that the
evidence of prior incidents shows a larger plan of which the offense charged
is a part, and consequently, is admissible to show motive or some other
specific fact.81 This is not the meaning adopted in State v. Little.82 The case
involved a narcotics prosecution in which the defendant urged that the
common plan exception was not available to the prosecution unless motive,
intent, or knowledge was in issue. The court disagreed, stating: "It is clear
that the exception relating to a common scheme or plan does not require,
as claimed by defendant, that motive, intent or knowledge, which are separate exceptions, be in issue." 83 The court rejected the state's evidence of
prior narcotics sales for the reason that there was no evidence of a series
of sales from a "single quantity" ' and no proof of "any planned relationship
between the various sales." 85 The court added: "The evidence of prior
sales is not relevant because it does not reasonably permit either part of the
double inference necessary to show the plan or scheme: first, from the
conduct to the plan; then, from the plan to its consummation by the act in
issue." 86 Apparently the court means by common plan, either division of a
78

Supra note 75.
79 Stevenson v. Stewart, 11 Pa. 307 (1849). See generally James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941).
80 Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23, 28, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (1887).
81 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 157, at 328 (1954).
82 87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756, 86 A.L.R.2d 1120 (1960).
83 350 P.2d at 761.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
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single batch, in the case of sales of contraband, or in such a case or other
cases, a planned relationship between the prior incidents of criminal or
wrongful conduct, whatever that may mean. An inference is then to be
drawn from the existence of a plan, thus vaguely defined, directly to the
criminal act for which the defendant is being tried, if such act is by way
of consummation of the plan. Surely, we are now playing a word game, or
coming very close to it, in an effort to tiptoe around the exclusionary rule.
Was the court saying that the Zackowitz rule does not apply if the evidence
of prior crimes is, by virtue of special circumstances, unusually cogent to show
that the defendant is guilty as charged-i.e., that he did the act in question?
Another way to state the question is simply this: Do we have a crystalized
rule here that evidence under the circumstances noted by the court is so
unusually cogent to show a defendant's proclivity for committing the crime
in issue that it can be admitted for this purpose? If so, we have taken a
tremendous slice out of the exclusionary rule-to the point where the application of the rule may depend on a very loose exercise of judicial discretion
on the issue of cogency.87 The same query could be made of the decisions
in which "common scheme or plan" means no more than close proximity
in time between the offense charged and prior acts plus substantial similiarity
in the conduct involved in the offense charged and such prior acts.
Professor McCormick notes some of the more narrow and well-defined
instances or purposes for which prior wrongful conduct is provable. 89 These
include identity of methods involving a distinctiveness so unusual as to be
like a signature; passion or propensity for illicit sexual relations with a particular person (such is not provable by evidence of prior sexual relations with
other persons. As additional illustrations, McCormick also notes the general
inadmissibility of prior instances of unnatural sexual conduct to prove such
offense in a particular case); negation of accident or mistake; and the showing of motive, intent, or identity.' All of this sounds very well, and indeed, a
bit glib. It has been apparent that the cases have used a "kitchen sink"
approach and relied on more than one of the items noted in most instances
of departure from the Zackowitz rule. Perhaps this has been for safety's
sake, as the difficulties involved in application can be severe and the lines
drawn so thin as to be threadbare. The problem of application can be
illustrated by reference to two decisions of the Court of Appeals of Virginia.
87 See infra note 109.
8H Cf. MCCORMCIK, EVIDENCE § 157,. at 322-33, and cases cited therein (1954).
89 Id. § 157.
90 Id. at 328-29. Even here the judges have limited the quantum of proof where it
has been felt that suffcient evidence has been introduced to accomplish the purpose of
the prosecution. See State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 103 A. 649 (1918).
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In Williams v. Commonwealth91 the accused was sentenced to death after
a jury verdict which found him guilty of murdering his wife with an axe.
The defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals stated that the only
issue before the court concerned the question as to possible error on the
part of the trial court in allowing the accused to be cross-examined regarding
a previous attack made by him upon his wife and his conviction for a
felony as a result of that attack.92 The trial judge stated, "I think the Commonwealth has a right to show other instances in order to show intent,
and that he beat her on this occasion," 9' but the Court of Appeals observed
that the accused had not placed his character in issue in this case and
that indeed he did not deny that he killed his wife by hitting her with an
axe.9 The court noted that that fact was not in issue and stated:
It is a well established common law rule that in a criminal prosecution,
proof which shows or tends to show that the accused is guilty of the
commission of other crimes and offenses at other times, even though they
are of the same nature as the one charged in the indictment, is incompetent and inadmissible for the purpose of showing the commission
of the particular crime charged ...
The tendency of such evidence to inflame and prejudice the jury outweighs its evidentiary value. The accused is entitled to be tried on the
accusation made in the indictment pending against him and not on some
collateral charge which is not in issue and which he is not prepared to
answer. This is no mere technical rule of law. It arises out of a fundamental demand for justice and fairness. 95
The court concluded that "[e]vidence that he had previously beaten her,
without more, did not tend to establish that he deliberately and premeditatedly killed her on this occasion." 96 The concurring opinion by Justices
Spratley and I'Anson made the point that the evidence offered in the
principal case would be admissible on the issue of intent if a proper limiting
instruction had been offered by the court to the jury; but the Commonwealth offered no such instruction, and the court gave none. 97 That being
true the evidence should not have been admitted.98 Justices Eggleston,
91 203 Va. 837, 127 S.E.2d 423 (1962).
92

Id. at 838-39, 127 S.E.2d at 424.
Id. at 840, 127 S.E.2d at 425.
94Id. at 840-41, 127 S.E.2d at 425-26.
95 Id. at 840-41, 127 S.E.2d at 426.
9
6Id. at 842, 127 S.E.2d at 426.
97
Id. at 843, 127 S.E.2d at 427.
9
8Ibid.
93

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3 :62

Snead, and Carrico dissented99 from the opinion of the majority. Justice
Carrico agreed with the rule applied by the majority of the court to the
effect that it is improper to admit in a prosecution for murder evidence
of prior assaults of the accused upon his victim for the purpose of proving
that the accused committed the crime for which he is charged, but noted
that this familiar rule had always been subject to well-defined exceptions. The
dissent added that such evidence should be admitted if it shows the conduct
and feelings of the accused toward his victim, if it establishes prior relations,
or if it tends to prove any relevant element of the offense charged. On this
point the court felt that the decision in the earlier Virginia case of O'Boyle
v. Commonwealth'00 was controlling. In a relatively lengthy opinion the
dissent then argued with considerable force, and on the basis of impressive
research, that the evidence should have been admitted for the purpose of
establishing the existence of malice, motive, and intent.0 ' The dissent
concluded with the suggestion that there could be no objection to the fact
that the defendant was asked on cross-examination whether or not he had
previously been convicted of a felony, since no objection was made when
the question was asked and no ruling of the trial court requested. In this
same connection the dissent quoted § 19.1-265 of the Code10 2 which provides: "Conviction of felony or perjury shall not render the convict incompetent to testify, but the fact of conviction may be shown in evidence
to affect his credit."
In Rees v. Commonwealth,1°3 the defendant was convicted of murder in
the first degree for the slaying of Carroll Vernon Jackson, Jr., in Virginia.
One of the assignments of error involved the defendant's objection to evidence and exhibits pertaining to the death of Mrs. Mildred Jackson and
her daughter.' °4 The court noted the general rule that the commission of
other crimes is not admissible evidence in a criminal prosecution and then
stated that this rule is subject to the exception that such evidence is admissible if it "tends to show a possible motive, intent, or a common scheme
embracing a commission of two or more crimes so closely related that proof
of one tends to establish the other." 105 The court, in the principal case,
held that the several deaths were "so intimately connected that all evidence
of the death of the other members of the family should not be excluded.
99 Id. at 843-49, 127 S.E.2d at 427-32.
100 100 Va. 785, 40 S.E. 121 (1901).
101 203 Va. at 845, 127 S.E.2d at 428.
102
VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 19.1-265 (Repl. vol. 1960).
103 203 Va. 850, 127 S.E.2d 406 (1962).
104Id. at 867-68, 127 S.E.2d at 418.
105 Id. at 868, 127 S.E.2d at 418.
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Moreover, the evidence tended to show a motive-abduction of Mrs. Jackson-for the murder of Jackson." 10 The trial court had excluded testimony
to the effect that in August 1958, Rees stopped Mr. and Mrs. Tuozzo
on a Maryland road and ordered Mr. Tuozzo, at pistol point, into the
trunk of the car and that thereafter Rees made a perverted sexual attack on
Mrs. Tuozzo. The trial judge had also excluded testimony that, in June
of 1957 in Maryland, Rees attempted to tie the hands of one Mr. Adams
and place him in the trunk of the car. Rees at that time was armed with
a pistol, and Mr. Adams was accompanied by a young lady who escaped
unharmed when a struggle ensued between Rees and Adams.1' 7 The court
stated:
In the admission and exclusion of evidence, the Court followed rules
which have long been established in Virginia. The Court sought to observe a narrow but more or less precise line that separates the inadmissible
from the admissible....
Thus, evidence of other crimes which tended to show the defendant's
proclivity to crime or his attitude was excluded.
Equally well established is the rule permitting the introduction of
evidence that shows motive .. .and circumstances 'so intimately connected and blended with the main fact adduced in evidence, that they
cannot be departed from with propriety; and there is no reason why the
criminality of such intimate and connected circumstances, should exclude
108
them, more than any other facts apparently innocent.' "
The narrow but more or less precise line referred to in this portion of
the opinion in the Rees case may furnish a clue to the reasoning of the
majority decision and at the same time serve to reconcile the majority
opinion of the principal case with the penetrating dissent written by Justice
Carrico. However, if it is true that any such reconciliation can be found
in the language of the Rees case, it will be achieved on a tenuous level. It
is difficult to find any logical distinction of significance between the evidence
approved in the Rees case on the one hand and the evidence which the
court would reject in the Williams case on the other hand.' 9
1105 Id. at 868, 127 S.E.2d at 419.
07 Id. at 869, 127 S.E.2d at 419.
108

id. at 870, 127 S.E.2d at 420.
l09 See generally MCCORmicK, EvmENCE § 157, at 327 (1954):
The rule is that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal acts
of the accused unless the evidence is substantially relevant for some other purpose
than to show a probability that he committed the crime on trial because he is a
man of criminal character. There are numerous other purposes for which evidence
of other criminal acts may be offered....
Such evidence is admissible "To show, by immediate inference, malice, deliberation,
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Finally reference should be made to the entrapment cases. Here the
accused is urging, by way of defense to the criminal charge against him,
that he is an an otherwise innocent person who would not have committed
the crime except for enticement or inducement from the police. It has
110
been stated in Sherman v. United States:
At the trial the factual issue was whether the informer had convinced
an otherwise unwilling person to commit a criminal act or whether
petitioner was already predisposed to commit the act and exhibit only
the natural hesitancy of one acquainted with the narcotics trade.
...Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct "was the
product of the creative activity" of law-enforcement officials.,
Thus there must be proof of inducement by the government agent. Then
the prosecution is afforded an opportunity to defeat the claim of entrapment by showing predisposition or readiness on the part of the accused to
commit the offense-this requires a searching inquiry into the prior conduct
and disposition of the defendant.11 2 The defendant's choice is graphically
described by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
The defendant must either forego the claim of entrapment or run
the substantial risk that, in spite of instructions, the jury will allow a
criminal record or bad reputation to weigh in its determination of guilt
of the specific offense of which he stands charged. Furthermore, a test
that looks to the character and predisposition of the defendant rather
than the conduct of the police loses sight of the underlying reason for
the defense of entrapment. No matter what the defendant's past record
and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has
rn-will or the specific intent required for a particular crime." Id. at 330. In § 157 n.15
McCormick mentions a decision involving a wife-murder in which previous acts of
violence to the wife were held to be provable for the purpose of establishing malice. It
should be noted that Professor McCormick's general statement of the rule involved does
include considerations of degree which inevitably affect a decision such as the one in
the principal case. Professor McCormick also points out the reluctance of the courts
in applying the standards of relevancy to admit evidence of the nature of the evidence
involved in the principal case when the ultimate purpose of the state is to prove knowledge, intent, or some other state of mind. E.g., Day v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907,
86 S.E.2d 23 (1955). Cf. Timmons v Commonwealth, 204 Va. 205, 129 S.E.2d 697
(1963); Adams v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 321, 111 S.E.2d 396 (1959).
110 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
M1Id. at 371-72.
112 Id. at 373.
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sunk in the estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him
13
into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society
What then are the limits involved in this free inquiry which might leave
intact the prospect of a free trial? It has been suggested that some
element of corroboration should exist, that the evidence cannot relate to
an event too remote in time, and, indeed, that there should be an arrest
followed by an indictment or conviction." 4 In absence of those factors the
defendant is helpless in rebuttal insofar as he may be forced to pit his word
against the unsupported testimony of an officer. 115 It might also be noted
that these requirements can go far in the direction of prejudice as far
as the accused is concerned, since they are designed to assure positive proof
of prior criminal activity. The court is wielding a two-edged sword here.
Finally, this is the kind of evidence that attracts publicity and invites
either a miscarriage of justice, a new trial, or a change of venue. The value
6
to the accused of the last two remedies borders on the speculative.U
CONCLUSION

It would be unrealistic, perhaps, to suggest that these myriad and wellentrenched exceptions to the Zackowitz rule be abandoned (nor is the
suggestion the thrust of this paper). It is redundant to state again what
seems obviously true-i.e., that the trial judge exercise extreme caution in
admitting this testimony. Some evidence is less prejudicial than other offers
of proof, and, presumably and hopefully, the court functions on this basis.
What more can be said by way of recommendation or conclusion?
This article began with a discussion of the privilege against self-incrimination. By way of repetition, analytically the privilege is not involved, there
113 Id. at 382-83 (concurring opinion).
114Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
States v. Cooper, 321 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1963).
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The judiciary cannot function properly if what the press does is calculated to

disturb the judicial judgment in its duty and its capacity to act solely on the
basis of what is before the court. Especially in the administration of the criminal
law, independent courts are a prerequisite of a free society. The safety of society
and the security of the innocent alike depend upon impartial and wise criminal
justice.

Too often cases are tried in newspapers before they are tried in court, and
thereby the assurance of a fair trial is enormously decreased. FRANKFURTER, OF
LAW AND MEN 245-46 (1956). See also United States v Accardo, 298 F.2d 133
(7th Cir. 1962).
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being no sovereign pressure to force the accused to furnish evidence against
himself. But analytically, too, the policy undergirding the privilege is lurking near. Any rule castigating the exceptions discussed herein is difficult
to state in policy terms, but the reason for balancing cogency and prejudice
involves analagous considerations to the rule allowing the accused to refrain
from taking the stand. Such a rule would not unduly hinder proof of guilt
and would convict the guilty in conformity with rules designed to protect
the innocent. The present practice allows evasion of the general exclusionary
rule and opens the door to its evils under the vaguest pretexts or solving
phrases. This practice can involve surprise and certainly substantial prejudice to the defendant, and, with the advancement of news media, surprise
and prejudice to the jury and to the public. Assuredly, something more
than traditional judicial discretion is called for here. Even in the entrapment cases it has been urged with force that the focus of attention in the
evidence should be on the conduct of the police and not that of the defendant.:1 7 Perhaps the two largest services rendered by the ancient privilege
are related and yet separable for purposes of statement. The privilege still
functions as a protection to the innocent man, and it stands as a reminder
of our traditional concern for the individual. These are not trivial functions,
and the policies can be and are being substantially diminished by a freewheeling use of the ill-defined exceptions to the Zackowitz doctrine.
The writer has already made two suggestions. First, as a practical matter
there would seem to be little hope that the exceptions to the exclusionary
rule will be either more precisely defined than they are now or that they
will be abandoned. Surely, though, careful and critical consideration should
be given to the notion that evidence of prior crimes forms a part of the res
gestae and equally careful consideration given to Professor McCormick's
relatively precise formulation of the "common scheme" exception to the
exclusionary rule.113 Second, it has been suggested that this kind of dynamite
might well lie outside the normal broad scope of judicial discretion. What
is here proposed is admittedly a compromise, but hopefully a workable one.
It is suggested that such evidence be ruled inadmissible unless it can be
shown by the prosecution that it is essential to the proof of an element of
the crime allegedly committed by the accused and, indeed, that its use in
this sense not be merely cumulative. This rule of necessity has been adopted
or hinted at before in the authorities. 119 It admittedly involves some degree
117 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-83 (1958)

(concurring opinion).

118 See text at note 40.

119 See, e.g., State v. Goebel, 36 Wash.2d 367, 218 P.2d 300, 306 (1950) ; MCCORMIC,
EVIDENCE § 157 (1954).
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of judicial discretion, but a much narrower degree than has been employed
heretofore, and the general rule will be one of exclusion. The rule proposed
will not solve all of the problems confronting an accused in this area, but
it will bring him substantially closer to Cardozo's ideal that the defendant
before the bar of justice starts life anew;1 ° it will lend more meaning
to the presumption of innocence now reduced statistically to something
approaching a clich6, and it will render more than lip service to the
currently vague but significant policies undergirding a privilege that analytical arguments cannot cast aside. As to the latter, tradition plays a part;
and it may well be true that the privilege expresses in part a step toward
civilization that the English language is not well-equipped to describe with
precision.

120 People v. Zackouitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930).

